Singapore High Court Sanctions Lawyer for AI-Generated Fictitious Case: [2025] SGHCR 33

Introduction

In September 2025, the General Division of the High Court of Singapore delivered one of the most important decisions to date on the use of artificial intelligence in legal practice. The case of Tajudin bin Gulam Rasul and another v Suriaya bte Haja Mohideen [2025] SGHCR 33 addressed the professional duties of advocates and solicitors when relying on AI-assisted tools for research and drafting. The Court imposed a personal costs order against counsel who cited a fictitious case generated by a generative AI application, making it clear that Singapore lawyers must independently verify all material filed in court. The ruling has attracted wide attention as the first Singapore judgment to penalise improper reliance on AI in litigation, and it serves as an authoritative warning to the legal profession.

Factual Background

The underlying dispute began in Originating Claim 125 of 2025. The defendant had failed to file a notice of intention to contest and a default judgment was entered against her. She applied in Summons 1240 to set aside the judgment. The claimants’ counsel, anticipating that the defendant might argue a defence of illegality under the Moneylenders Act, filed written submissions on 1 June 2025 which cited a case said to stand for the proposition that ad hoc loans between acquaintances do not amount to moneylending unless there is a systematic business for profit. This case was not included in the claimants’ bundle of authorities and when opposing counsel attempted to trace it, it became apparent that the case did not exist. The name and citation had been fabricated by a generative AI tool used by a junior lawyer in the firm.

On 18 July 2025, opposing counsel alerted the claimants’ counsel to the problem. On 21 July 2025, just one day before the hearing, the claimants’ counsel filed amended submissions and a supplementary bundle containing a replacement authority, without seeking the Court’s leave. In his explanation, he described the matter as a clerical or typographical mistake. It was only during the hearing on 22 July 2025, when pressed by the Court, that he admitted the authority was fictitious and that AI had been used in the preparation of submissions.

The Court’s Findings

Assistant Registrar Tan Yu Qing held that advocates and solicitors are officers of the court who must uphold the highest standards of conduct. This includes the fundamental duty to ensure that every authority cited is real, accurate and appropriate. The Court emphasised that citing a fictitious authority, whether generated by AI or not, is wholly impermissible. It undermines confidence in the administration of justice and wastes judicial resources as well as the other party’s time and costs.

The Court noted that the Singapore judiciary had already issued a Guide on the Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence Tools by Court Users. That guide makes clear that AI outputs must always be independently verified, that AI should be treated only as an aid, and that ultimate responsibility lies with the lawyer. It is not sufficient to ask one AI tool to confirm the output of another. The responsibility is personal and non-delegable.

Applying the three-stage test from Ridehalgh v Horsefield, as adopted in Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew, the Court considered first whether the conduct was improper, unreasonable or negligent. The Court found that it was all three. The claimants’ counsel did not verify the authority on LawNet, failed to exhibit it in the bundle of authorities, and attempted to downplay the problem as a minor error. The Court also found his candour lacking, as he only admitted the truth when pressed.

The second stage of the test asked whether unnecessary costs had been caused. The Court accepted that the defendant’s counsel had to expend time and resources to check the non-existent case, alert opposing counsel and raise the matter before the Court. The third stage required the Court to decide whether it was just to order compensation. The Court concluded that fairness, the integrity of the justice system and deterrence all required a personal costs order.

Orders Made

The Court ordered the claimants’ counsel to personally pay the defendant the sum of S$800, representing the costs incurred as a result of the fictitious citation. The payment was to be made within 14 days. The Court also directed that both counsel provide their respective clients with a copy of the decision, underscoring the seriousness with which it viewed the matter.

Broader Significance

This decision represents a turning point in Singapore jurisprudence on artificial intelligence and legal ethics. It affirms that while the courts do not prohibit the use of AI in preparing submissions, lawyers must take full responsibility for every word filed under their name. The ruling confirms that the citation of fabricated cases, even if inadvertent, constitutes misconduct that can attract financial penalties. It also shows that courts will not hesitate to impose personal costs where lawyers fail in their supervisory responsibilities or attempt to conceal errors.

The implications are profound for legal practice. Lawyers who use generative AI tools must implement robust verification processes, relying on official legal research platforms such as LawNet and Singapore Statutes Online. Senior lawyers must exercise direct supervision over juniors and support staff and cannot delegate responsibility. Candour to the Court is essential. Prompt and honest disclosure of errors is always preferable to minimisation or obfuscation.

Conclusion

The case of Tajudin bin Gulam Rasul and another v Suriaya bte Haja Mohideen [2025] SGHCR 33 should be regarded as a cautionary precedent. It demonstrates the Singapore High Court’s firm stance that fictitious or AI-generated authorities will not be tolerated and that lawyers who fail to meet their professional duties will bear personal financial consequences. The decision reinforces the principle that truth is the foundation of adjudication and that public trust in the justice system depends on the integrity of those who appear before the courts.