Introduction
The Court of Appeal’s judgment in DAN v Public Prosecutor [2025] SGCA 45 is a decisive reaffirmation of the moral and institutional foundations of sentencing. Delivered by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, with Justice of the Court of Appeal Steven Chong and Senior Judge Judith Prakash concurring, the decision stands as one of the most severe and profound pronouncements in Singapore’s sentencing jurisprudence. The Court enhanced the sentence imposed on a father who had tortured his two young children for two years and caused the death of his five-year-old daughter, Ayeesha. The enhancement was from a fifteen-year imprisonment term to life imprisonment under section 304(a) of the Penal Code. The judgment not only addressed the cruelty of the conduct but redefined how Singaporean courts should treat crimes that defy the limits of human decency.
Factual Background
This decision goes beyond the immediate case. It articulates the purpose of sentencing as both a legal and moral act. It reaffirms that where conduct annihilates the fundamental duty of care that parents owe to their children, the law must speak in its most emphatic voice. Retribution and deterrence become not abstract principles but the necessary guardians of societal morality. The Court’s reasoning underscores that sentencing is not merely the mechanical allocation of punishment but the conscious articulation of collective conscience through legal order.
The facts were almost unbearable to recount, but the Court did so deliberately and in detail. The offender, formerly an auxiliary police officer trained in martial arts, repeatedly kicked, punched, caned and stomped on his two children, confining them naked in filthy spaces for months at a time. They were often starved, forced to live in a toilet, and left under camera surveillance so that their father could monitor them remotely. The abuse continued until the fatal assaults on 10 and 11 August 2017, when the father struck Ayeesha fifteen to twenty times in the head and face, leaving her lifeless on the floor. He then attempted to conceal evidence and mislead the police. An autopsy revealed that Ayeesha had suffered massive internal bleeding and brain swelling. She was severely undernourished, weighing only 13 kilograms. Her body bore dozens of bruises and abrasions.
The High Court had imposed a sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment for the culpable homicide charge, four years for each of four counts of child abuse under section 5 of the Children and Young Persons Act, and three and a half years for disposal of evidence, resulting in an aggregate of thirty-four and a half years and six months in lieu of caning. The Court of Appeal found this insufficient to capture the magnitude of the crimes. Even though the Prosecution had not appealed for a higher sentence, the Court exercised its power under section 390(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code to enhance the punishment. It held that the appellate court’s duty is not limited by procedural formality but guided by the overriding need to ensure that justice is done in substance. When the sentence imposed by the trial court is manifestly inadequate, the appellate court must intervene to restore public confidence and maintain coherence in sentencing principles.
The Court’s Findings
The Court’s reasoning rested on two related foundations. The first was that the case fell within the highest category of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The second was that the moral depravity of the offences required the strongest possible denunciation. The Court reiterated that life imprisonment is the maximum punishment for culpable homicide under section 304(a) of the Penal Code and is reserved for cases representing the most severe forms of the offence. Importantly, the Court clarified that “worst type” does not mean the worst conceivable. It refers instead to the most egregious range of conduct in practice, characterised by cruelty, deliberate harm, sustained abuse, and absence of mitigation. To qualify, the offender’s actions must show complete disregard for human life and dignity.
Applying this framework, the Court identified five defining elements that justified life imprisonment. The first was the extreme cruelty and viciousness of the fatal attacks. The assaults were not a momentary loss of temper but a conscious sequence of violent acts committed against a defenceless child already weakened by long-term starvation and injury. The brutality continued even after the child had fallen to the floor and was incapable of resistance.
The second element was the prolonged and escalating pattern of abuse. The fatal assault did not occur in isolation but as the culmination of a two-year campaign of cruelty. The children were beaten, confined, and deprived of food for months. This context transformed the fatal act from a discrete offence into the final stage of sustained torture. The Court compared this with previous cases such as Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and Public Prosecutor v BDB, both of which involved prolonged abuse of children, but noted that the present case surpassed even those in its scale, persistence, and moral corruption.
The third element was the special vulnerability of the victims. Ayeesha and her brother were extremely young, physically weak, and entirely dependent on their father. The Court stressed that child victims are inherently defenceless, and that where an adult inflicts violence upon a child, the imbalance of power creates a moral aggravation that is inescapable. The fourth element was the betrayal of parental trust and repudiation of duty. The appellant was not merely a guardian but the biological father and sole caregiver. His authority, which ought to have been a source of protection, became the instrument of terror. The Court called the relationship between parent and child the “ultimate relationship of trust and authority” and held that its abuse warranted the law’s most severe condemnation.
The fifth element was the absence of any mitigating circumstance. The offender was mentally sound, his actions were intentional, and his belated plea of guilt was self-serving. The Court rejected the suggestion that a guilty plea warranted a reduction under the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s Guidelines, invoking the public interest exception which allows a court to deny mitigation in cases where leniency would undermine justice or offend societal morality. It observed that the offender had lied repeatedly, attempted to dispose of evidence, and pleaded guilty only after being confronted with irrefutable proof. The plea was not a sign of remorse but a recognition of futility.
Orders Made
Together, these features placed the case beyond the limits of temporal punishment. The fifteen-year sentence, in the Court’s view, failed to convey society’s horror or to express the necessary retribution. Life imprisonment, by contrast, signified not vengeance but moral accountability. It ensured that the punishment would endure as long as the gravity of the offence required, while protecting the public from the offender indefinitely. The Court emphasised that the law must serve as a mirror of collective conscience, particularly when the victims cannot speak for themselves.
The Court also considered the other charges. It upheld the High Court’s imposition of the statutory maximum of four years’ imprisonment for each of the child abuse offences under section 5 of the Children and Young Persons Act. The confinement of both children naked in a small, foul toilet for nearly ten months was described as among the most egregious forms of child ill-treatment ever presented to a Singapore court. Similarly, the 16-minute beating of Ayeesha captured on CCTV, during which she was struck more than eighty times, was classified as one of the worst types of such offences. The Court affirmed that these charges properly attracted the statutory maximum. Although these terms became concurrent with the life sentence, the analysis provides clear guidance for future cases. It establishes that deliberate and systematic cruelty to children by those in authority should attract the highest penalty available, even when death does not occur.
In discussing sentencing methodology, the Court explained that punishment proceeds in two stages. First, the court determines the appropriate sentence for each individual offence, considering aggravating and mitigating factors. Second, the totality principle requires the court to review whether the overall sentence is proportionate to the offender’s overall culpability. The appellate court found that even if life imprisonment had not been imposed for the homicide charge, the cumulative gravity of all the offences would have justified increasing the other sentences to their statutory maxima to reflect the total criminality.
The Court also provided important clarification on the conceptual structure of culpable homicide. It distinguished two broad categories. The first covers cases originally charged as murder but reduced due to a partial defence such as diminished responsibility or provocation. The second covers cases where the prosecution elects to charge culpable homicide directly, often because the evidence does not meet the mental element for murder or because the prosecution exercises discretion not to seek the death penalty. In this case, no partial defence existed and no mitigating mental abnormality was present. The offence was fully intentional and deliberate. Hence, the Court held that there was no reason to exclude life imprisonment as a matter of principle.
The Court also examined precedent. It compared the present case with earlier decisions including Public Prosecutor v Firdaus bin Abdullah, Public Prosecutor v AFR, Azlin bte Arujunah, and Public Prosecutor v BDB. Each involved horrific abuse of children, but the present case exceeded them in cruelty, duration, and breach of trust. The Court observed that previous offenders had acted in moments of anger or neglect, whereas the appellant here demonstrated methodical sadism. He monitored his victims with cameras, calculated their confinement, and maintained their suffering as a matter of routine. These distinctions justified the maximum penalty.
The judgment also reinforces the public interest function of sentencing. The Court emphasised that punishment for crimes of this nature must extend beyond the individual offender. It serves to reaffirm societal norms and deter others who might contemplate similar cruelty. It preserves faith in the justice system by demonstrating that no privilege, position, or parental authority can shield an offender from ultimate accountability. Sentencing in such cases must therefore operate as a form of social pedagogy — teaching through example that the law will not merely punish but condemn.
Beyond doctrine, the judgment carries institutional lessons. It shows that the appellate court’s power to correct inadequate sentences is an integral safeguard within the criminal justice system. Even without a prosecution appeal, the Court acted on its own motion to restore proportionality. This vigilance ensures that no miscarriage of sentencing justice persists simply because a procedural step was omitted. It also demonstrates that appellate review is not adversarial but custodial: the Court’s responsibility is to the integrity of the system itself.
Broader Significance
The broader lesson lies in the moral architecture of justice. Law and morality converge when the courts confront acts that negate the essence of humanity. Sentencing becomes the mechanism by which society reasserts its fundamental values. The Court’s vivid description of Ayeesha’s suffering was not gratuitous but necessary. It acknowledged that law must give voice to those who have none. The act of describing cruelty becomes an act of remembrance, ensuring that the legal record itself bears witness to what was done.
For practitioners and institutions, DAN v Public Prosecutor serves as a template for systemic responsibility. Prosecutors must ensure that sentencing submissions fully reflect the public interest and moral context of the case. Defence counsel must approach appeals involving egregious violence with candour and restraint, recognising that tactical appeals risk sentence enhancement. Courts must continue to use their inherent and statutory powers to maintain coherence and proportionality. Policymakers and child protection agencies must treat the case as a reminder of the necessity of early detection, inter-agency coordination, and social vigilance. Teachers, doctors, and neighbours are often the first and only line of defence for vulnerable children; the law’s response must be complemented by community awareness.
Conclusion
The judgment closes with a message that transcends criminal law. It affirms that punishment, in its truest sense, is the reassertion of humanity through the law. Life imprisonment in this context is not simply the removal of an offender from society but the re-establishment of moral order. When a parent turns predator and a child’s suffering ends only in death, the law’s duty is not to balance compassion with justice but to ensure that compassion is restored to society through justice.
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